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"The Impossible Diplomacy of Human Rights" Lecture by U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights Zeid Ra'ad Al Hussein

Lecture by Zeid Ra'ad Al Hussein, United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, at
 Georgetown University on the occasion of the presentation of the Trainor Award for Excellence in the Conduct of Diplomacy

16 February 2017

Good afternoon,

A new era is unfolding before us. We find ourselves in a political earthquake zone. To many of us it appears the international system could become dangerously unstable. Fresh shocks are opening up unsuspected fault-lines, weight-bearing pillars are in danger of collapse. Our humanitarian colleagues are being asked to do the impossible, as the number and scale of raging conflicts continue to cause immense suffering and force unprecedented numbers of people to flee their homes. Violent groups of inconceivable brutality are still emerging from this furnace of wars. And countries in southern Africa are struggling with catastrophic drought. It is difficult to overstate the gravity of these and other crises, which we currently face.

Yet rather than dealing with them, we seem to be turning away and looking inwards. These and other emergencies are accompanied by an intensifying breakdown in the basic consensus, embedded in key international and regional institutions, a consensus which has for decades maintained, supported and regulated the relations between states and their behaviour. That system was always flawed, but for more than 70 years it had the undeniable advantage of staving off the prospect of World War III. Now we are witnessing a sudden and massive erosion of the commitments underpinning it.

A few months ago, I gave a short speech in The Netherlands in which I named a number of political leaders whose discriminatory and alarming rhetoric seemed based on a vision of a supposedly “pure”, illusory, past. Some weeks later, the French presidential contender Marine Le Pen responded with an open letter that, I think clearly illustrates the fundamental difference between our world-views.

Madame Le Pen’s central point is the assertion that within her political positioning “there is no resentment against anyone, no desire for nostalgia; but the simple desire, democratically expressed – serenely and peacefully – to protect and amplify our culture … and quite simply to continue to exist.” 

The question is: protect it from what? From whom does her country need protection? And how does she propose this protection be accomplished in order for her people to “continue to exist”? It would appear her intended targets, at least in the letter, are not the terrorists from whom we all need protection, but the international and regional laws and institutions my colleagues and I promote and represent. She writes that we form a “global hyperclass... a caste which scorns peoples, and thus human beings, their diversity and specific riches.” 

There is a curious paradox in this vocal defence of diversity, because it is common knowledge the immigrant population of France is targeted by Le Pen’s National Front party, which manifests evident intolerance of diverse customs, beliefs and modes of thought.

In attempting to understand this apparent contradiction, I cast back to the thinking of German jurist Carl Schmitt, who in the interwar period theorized an ideal world made up of nations of homogenous peoples – sharply demarcated, cleansed of outsiders and deeply bonded with a specific land. Diversity was acceptable between States, but not within them. A sovereign had a positive duty to identify and eliminate outsiders, according to Schmitt's thinking.

Madame Le Pen may or may not adhere to this general view of the world, but I do believe it is increasingly widespread today – and it is evident in the growing drive to protectionism, unilateralism, proclamations of national or religious purity, and rejection of what some have taken to calling “so-called international law”. I find it deeply alarming. It is a wanton threat to the balance of human progress achieved over the past 70 years including the evident and immense benefits brought about by international law. It undermines not only development but also peace.

Today’s nationalists seem, perhaps deliberately, to feed off the threat of terrorism. Terrorist violence is real and it is foul. But the nationalists fail to acknowledge that the perpetrators of most recent terrorist attacks are takfiris, who have taken up a militant ideology, clearly identified. The vast majority of Muslims are not takfiris – not in France or here in the U.S., or anywhere else; nor do they come even close to supporting the takfiris, who have murdered tens of thousands of Muslims, and displaced hundreds of thousands of others, in the pursuit of their ideology. To thwart the takfiris, would it not be far smarter to tap into the huge number of Muslims who despise them, instead of alienating the very group most likely to unmask their operations?

Imprecision can be a blunt and terrible instrument.

After all, when victims are dishonoured by those who exploit their very real suffering for political purpose, is that not imprecision in its most cynical form?

Second to absolute power alone, it is fabricated or exaggerated victimhood which corrupts absolutely. Tragically, it also remains very much part of the political seducer’s art. They then claim licence to do whatever is necessary, lawfully or otherwise, to correct those grievances. An entire community is identified as the source, the enemy – an enemy stripped of individuality, a group which thinks and plots as one.

Time and again, humanity has lost its bearings on the back of half-truths and lies, and the results have been disastrous. And an essential cohesion at the heart of every social fabric, once textured and fluid, is torn apart and replaced by sharp social divisions.

The last speech I delivered in Washington was at the Holocaust Museum, in 2015. Our collective historical experience with the lethality of anti-Semitism, in producing the colossal crime – the Holocaust – against the Jewry of Europe, imparts lessons every political leader, everywhere, should never lose sight of. There are no exact parallels with the modern day: no major political leader is a Nazi. But consider the case of Karl Lueger, the late 19th century Mayor of Vienna.

Karl Lueger had Jewish friends, and so startling was this fact, a Viennese journalist even asked him about it. “I decide who is a Jew,” was his purported response. That Lueger was one of the most rabid and consequential anti-Semites of the late nineteenth century was no contradiction to him, because his anti-Semitism was most probably never a matter of conviction. Karl Lueger merely recognized how anti-Semitism, fanned in the right circumstances, could yield enormous political dividends. Ballots would rain down on whatever political figure most effectively whipped up the winds of hatred.

The formula was clear: claim to represent an anxious group; amplify their grievances and sense of victimhood with slurs and outright lies directed against a community perceived as outsiders – on the basis of race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or any other arbitrary status. Persevere until the community is seen as homogenous, somehow collectively perverse in thought and deed.

Do it all skilfully and the first lock toward political ascendency is picked. But at what cost ultimately? And what of the rights of those, against whom the persecution is aimed?

In Karl Lueger’s case this device inspired -- shortly before World War I -- a young face in a Viennese crowd, listening eagerly, absorbing Lueger’s peddling of hate, a man who in September1939 would plunge the world into an inferno.

Today’s nationalisms, with their hatreds in tow -- are different – but perhaps not different enough.

That millions of people have experienced profound suffering inflicted by this kind of hatred in the past, should surely have deterred by now any man or woman from mimicking Lueger’s stratagems, in however diluted form they may be. That political leaders still do so today, in countries where the lessons of two world wars should have been fully absorbed, is stupefying.

Can we be so reckless, so stupid, as to risk the future of humanity, simply for the sake of ballots?

Are we not being marched back to a Sarajevo?

To a Sarajevo of 1914, when the flammable competitive bristling of ethnic nationalisms eroded balances of power and any sense of compromise, to the point where a relatively obscure event at the margins of European politics triggered global catastrophe. Or maybe to a Sarajevo of the 1990s, and the war I was exposed to when I served in the former Yugoslavia. All the grievances, the lies that distorted them, the bitter ethnic nationalisms they re-ignited – and then military aggression, death and destruction. Revealing above all the thinness of European civilization, and its easy envelopment or puncture by the most bestial behaviour.

In Bosnia and Herzegovina, we understood if this could happen in Europe in the 1990s it could still, given the right stimuli, happen anywhere. But those more recent lessons too, we seem to be forgetting.

A pathogen of divisive populism has infected a portion of the world so swiftly, much of what we work for now seems threatened. In such circumstances – when the deep, long-term work of prevention, and investment in a common future, risk being swept away – what can human rights diplomacy possibly hope to achieve? Is this impossibly complex job becoming futile?

Emphatically not.

Rather than buckling under that load, I am convinced the current state of the world reinforces the importance of the work we do. Our guidance, monitoring, advocacy and expertise are essential tools for repelling assaults on human rights. They provide a robust framework within which to stand up for those whose rights are threatened or violated.

Our work changes not just laws, but lives. It protects the most vulnerable, and inspires and supports activists struggling in dangerous conditions for the rights of the people to have a voice in their own affairs. These activists are the true forces of stability. We have no choice. There is simply no alternative – we must continue our work, if human life and well-being are to be maintained. So much is at stake, and we can do it. Consider what was achieved by our predecessors, the giants of the rights movements: they ended slavery, colonialism, segregation, apartheid and more. The struggle which falls to our generation today therefore is far from hopeless.

We need – all of us – to defend international law -- international refugee law, international human rights law, international humanitarian law, international criminal law. For they – and the institutions that uphold them – are the very distillation and sum of human experience. They are not, as some would have you believe, the outcome of post-war bureaucratic doodling. They were woven together from the screams of millions who died violently or suffered horribly over many centuries. We know very well what will happen, should they be dissolved.

I work, in Geneva, in the building that housed the League of Nations. Every day, I am reminded of what we have to lose. Human progress is never perfect. We make mistakes, we stumble; we forget core truths. Truths such as that laid down by the unanimously endorsed Universal Declaration of Human Rights: recognition of the inherent dignity and of the equal and inalienable rights of all human beings being the foundation of freedom, justice and peace in the world. So yes, sometimes we do falter –the political and economic elites in particular.

But, if we lash out blindly at each other and bring the whole house crashing down around us, so expensive will be the price paid by humanity, we could place ourselves well beyond recovery. 

I want, Ladies and Gentlemen, to belong to a rights based-movement of human beings. One that cares for everyone, stands up for everyone, and will march whenever and wherever it is needed. Surely what we saw on the 21st of January was the clearest expression of a common human faith.

I want to be one of those who speaks up on every occasion. Stands up to defend the rights of everyone, peacefully – especially those most vulnerable.

I want to believe the human impulse towards a greater good will always eclipse those menacing instincts lying deep within us all, that makes us vulnerable to suggestion.

I want to be part of a movement beyond my affiliations to family, to tribe or nationality, beyond my ethnicity, race, religion or gender, my professional affiliation, my sexual orientation or the like.

To put it another way, Ladies and Gentlemen, eclipsing all the other identities I may have, I want to feel human first – human first.

I want you to feel this too.

Please join me.

This lecture was originally posted on 16 February 2017

"Victims bring a Dictator to Justice: The Case of Hissène Habré" by Reed Brody

See below for a short summary of the paper written by Reed Brody, a Commissioner of the International Commission of Jurists. The full text of the document can be found here. 

"On May 30, 2016, a special court in Senegal convicted the exiled former dictator of Chad Hissène Habré of crimes against humanity, war crimes and torture, including rape and sexual slavery. It was the first time ever that a head of state had been prosecuted in the courts of another country. The case was widely hailed as a milestone for justice in Africa. In July 2016, the court ordered Habré to pay approximately 90 million euros in victim compensation. The case is now on appeal.

Most importantly, the trial was the fruit of what the Toronto Globe and Mail called “one of the world’s most patient and tenacious campaigns for justice” (York 2013), waged over two decades by Habré’s victims and their supporters, who improbably succeeded in creating the political conditions to bring a former African president to justice in Africa, with the support of the African Union.

The uniqueness of the campaign was that it put the victims at the center, creating not just an irresistible political dynamic but a trial itself that both showcased the victims’ efforts and largely met their expectations. Even rape victims broke their 25-year silence to testify. As Thierry Cruvellier, a frequent critic of international courts, remarked glowingly in the New York Times, “[n]ever in a trial for mass crimes have the victims’ voices been so dominant” (Cruvellier 2016).

The launch of proceedings against Habré before the Extraordinary African Chambers in Senegal also spurred justice efforts back in Chad, where a court in 2015 convicted 20 Habré-era agents and ordered the government to pay millions in victim compensation.

Like the 1998 London arrest of Chile’s Augusto Pinochet, which inspired the Chadian victims to pursue justice in Senegal, the Habré case has motivated many others, in Africa and elsewhere, to think about potential justice campaigns.

The Habré case shows that it is possible for a coalition of victims and NGOs, with tenacity and imagination, to create the conditions for a successful universal jurisdiction prosecution, even against a former head of state.

This paper seeks to highlight some of the lessons of the Habré campaign, in the hopes that it can assist others who are organizing to bring their tormentors to book."

 

Statement of ICC Prosecutor, Fatou Bensouda, before the UN Security Council on the Situation in Darfur, pursuant to UNSCR 1593 (2005)

New York
13 December 2016

Mr President, Your Excellencies,

1. Thank you for the opportunity to present my Office's Twenty-fourth report on the situation in Darfur, pursuant to UN Security Council Resolution 1593.

2. Six months have passed since my last report to this Council, and indeed, nearly a decade has passed since the first warrant of arrest was issued by the Court in the situation of Darfur. As I present this Twenty-fourth report before you today, it is with immense regret that I acknowledge once again that all five suspects against whom warrants of arrest have been issued by the International Criminal Court in this situation remain at large.

3. As the longing for justice of the victims of Rome Statute crimes in Darfur remains unfulfilled, the suspects, Messrs Omar Al Bashir, Abdel Hussein and Ahmad Harun continue to occupy high-ranking positions within the Government of Sudan without subjecting themselves to the scrutiny of the law so that their guilt or innocence can be established. What is more, Mr Ali Kushayb continues to be active in Government of Sudan's-aligned militias operating in Darfur while another suspect, Mr Abdallah Banda also remains at large in Sudan.

4. Time may lapse, but time does not erase the fact that serious crimes have been committed in Darfur, resulting in the untold suffering of victims. And time will not change the fact that these five men stand accused of multiple crimes against humanity and war crimes, and additionally, in the case of Mr Al Bashir, genocide. These constitute the world's most serious crimes. We must ensure, Mr President, Excellencies, that time also does not erode this fact in our memories, nor our obligations to hold those responsible for these egregious crimes accountable.

5. Let me recall by way of a few examples the gravity of these crimes. It is alleged that between August 2003 and March 2004 in the town of Mukjar, West Darfur, over seventy men were summarily executed after being detained and tortured by the Janjaweed and Sudanese Army. In that same period, women and girls were raped and sexually assaulted. Civilians were attacked, forcibly expelled from their homes, and herded into IDP camps.

6. In an attempt to stop the violence and restore peace, the African Union ("AU") deployed a peace keeping operation in Darfur. Yet, despite their protected status, in September 2007, rebel forces under the command of Mr Banda are alleged to have attacked and murdered AU peacekeepers at their base in Haskanita, including one peacekeeper from a State which is currently a Member before this Council. The courageous women and men who risk their lives in international and regional efforts to maintain peace deserve not only our respect and admiration, but also the best protection we can afford them. That protection, surely includes holding those who target and attack peacekeepers accountable for such crimes.

7. These are a just a few illustrations of the many crimes I am trying to prosecute as a result of the referral from this Council; crimes which the Pre-trial Chambers of the International Criminal Court have determined there are grounds to believe were committed by the Darfur suspects.

Mr President, Your Excellencies,

8. I refer to these crimes because it is critical that we do not lose sight of the ultimate purpose of these half-yearly briefings. These briefings should be more than a simple routine in fulfilment of a prescribed timetable. They should be seen as an opportunity for dialogue and exchange of views between my Office and this Council on how best to achieve the objectives of Resolution 1593, so that independent and impartial justice can be delivered to the Darfur victims.

9. As my report makes clear, the Rome Statute system has two essential pillars: a judicial pillar provided by the International Criminal Court and an execution and enforcement pillar, provided by State Parties, and in the context of the Darfur situation this Council. The Office's reports are intended not only to provide relevant updates, but also to galvanise and mobilise this Council to enforce the obligations created by Resolution 1593 and the Rome Statute legal framework.

10. Resolution 1593 was intended to enable my Office to establish the truth and deliver justice to the victims of Rome Statute crimes in Darfur. Instead, as time passes, ICC fugitives continue to travel across international borders unimpeded by the failure of Sudan, other States, including – I regret to say – some States Parties, to enforce the Court's arrest warrants.

11. A further aggravating factor is this Council's inaction. It is no surprise then that victims and witnesses of the Office are slowly but surely losing faith in the process of international criminal justice in Darfur. We must ask ourselves some tough but honest questions. What are we to say to victims that continue to suffer in Darfur, to the individuals who have uprooted their lives to be witnesses and had the courage to tell their story? How can we maintain their trust in the judicial process when they continue to observe Mr Al Bashir and other suspects traversing the globe with impunity? Victims, including some I have met with personally, are puzzled and dismayed by the Council's lack of action.

Mr President, Your Excellencies,

12. It is almost eight years since the Pre-trial Chamber of the International Criminal Court issued the first warrant of arrest against Mr Al Bashir. Yet, during each reporting period, Mr Al Bashir travels to different States, attending events ranging from presidential inaugurations to international sporting events.

13. According to my Office's information, Mr Al Bashir has crossed international borders on 131 occasions since March 2009, on 14 occasions to State Parties and on 117 occasions to non-State Parties. His movements are traceable. The world knows where he is, where he travels to – often in advance, from the media.

14. There is ample opportunity for Mr Al Bashir to be apprehended - if the political will exists amongst States, and indeed, this Council. As I stated to this Council in June, the lack of action by this body has emboldened States to continue to host Mr Al Bashir. It also emboldens the Darfur fugitives to travel as demonstrated by a recent visit by Mr Al Bashir together with Mr Hussein to a non-State Party. This open display of impunity undermines Resolution 1593 and the credibility of this Council.

15. The legal position regarding the obligation of States Parties to arrest and surrender Mr Al Bashir should he travel to their territory could not be clearer. As the Pre-Trial Chamber II stated in its non-compliance decision of 9 April 2014:

[N]owhere in any decision issued by the Court is there the slightest ambiguity about the Chambers' legal position regarding Omar Al Bashir's arrest and surrender to the Court, despite the arguments invoked relating to his immunity under international law.


16. As this Council will recall, South Africa failed to arrest Mr Al Bashir during his visit in June 2015. On 8 December 2016, the Chamber issued a decision to convene a public hearing, to be held on 7 April 2017, in relation to a possible finding of non-compliance for South Africa's failure to arrest and surrender Mr Al Bashir to the Court.

17. The Chamber has not only invited South Africa and my Office to make written and oral submissions, but has also invited the United Nations to attend the hearing and be heard. This opportunity will allow the United Nations to set forth its position on non-compliance with UN Security Council referrals to the Court and the role to be played by the Security Council in non-compliance proceedings. The Chamber further invited all interested States Parties to provide any relevant submissions should they wish to do so.

18. Most recently, the Court found States Parties, Uganda and Djibouti, in non-compliance for failing to arrest Mr Al Bashir during visits to those countries in July of this year and referred the matter to this Council. In these decisions, the Court emphasised the critical role of this Council when non-compliance findings are referred to it. Specifically, it stated, and I quote:

In the absence of follow-up actions on the part of the Security Council, any referral to the Court under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations would become futile and incapable of achieving its ultimate goal of putting an end to impunity.

19. I can only underscore the necessity of this Council taking swift and concrete action to ensure compliance with all arrest warrants against the fugitives in Darfur situation. This includes action against Sudan for its continued and open defiance of the Court's orders and Resolution 1593.

20. The Pre-trial Chamber has now issued 13 decisions finding non-compliance and/or requesting for appropriate action to be taken against Sudan and States Parties for failing to arrest Mr Al Bashir and other fugitives.

21. At a minimum, this Council ought to consider referencing these decisions in a separate resolution as has been done in the Libya situation when this body issued Resolution 2213.
22. It is not enough for Council Members to continue calling for support for the Court. Such calls have to be matched by concrete action.

23. In this regard, serious consideration should be given to New Zealand's recommendation on 9 June 2016. New Zealand stated that when a finding of non-compliance is received, the Council should consider using the tools at its disposal, such as a draft resolution or statement, letter, or a meeting with the country concerned.

24. And let us not forget that the failure to execute warrants of arrest is not limited to Mr Al Bashir; to date, the ICC arrest warrants against Messrs Harun and Kushayb remains outstanding for almost 10 years; against Mr Hussein for almost five years, and against Mr Banda for just over two years.

25. I benefit from this forum to call on all states to fully cooperate with the Court in the arrest and surrender of suspects against whom ICC arrest warrants have been issued. Allowing suspects to travel across international borders with impunity not only severely undermines the Council's credibility and that of the Court, but equally erodes public confidence in our common responsibility to end impunity for the world's most serious crimes as well as our ability to ensure victims attain the justice they so rightly deserve.

Mr President, Your Excellencies,

26. In the face of the failure to arrest the Darfur suspects, it is no surprise that allegations of the commission of new crimes under the Statute continue to be reported in Darfur.

27. According to the information, my Office has obtained, hundreds of civilians were reportedly killed since April 2016. The area of Jebel Marra continues to be an area of conflict and instability and this has a dire impact upon civilians. Since June of this year, there have been new clashes between the Government of Sudan and the Sudan Liberation Movement-Abdul Wahid in Jebel Marra, resulting in aerial bombardments by the Government.

28. Some 80 civilians were allegedly killed as a result of these bombardments, mainly in Jebel Marra.

29. Additionally, as the Council is aware, the African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur reported on 1 July 2016 that women and girls continue to suffer from sexual and gender-based violence, including conflict related violence.

30. Particularly worrying is the recent, as yet unconfirmed, allegation by Amnesty International that the Government of Sudan may have deployed chemical weapons on civilians during several attacks on Jebel Marra in Darfur throughout the course of 2016. It is alleged that 200 to 250 people, including many children, may have died from exposure to chemical weapons.

31. My Office is taking the steps it can to verify whether the allegations are true. I note that the Government of Sudan has denied the claims, and to date, both the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons and UNAMID have not come across evidence that supports the claims. However, it must also be noted that the Government of Sudan severely restricts access of UNAMID and other organisations to the Jebel Marra region.

32. Denying access to the United Nations, the AU and other international humanitarian actors prevents aid getting to the victims and internally displaced, and potentially enables the parties to the conflict to cover up crimes against civilians committed in the conflict zones. It is imperative for the Government of Sudan to facilitate access to the Jebel Marra.

33. Consistent with its policy of total non-cooperation with the Court, Sudan also denies access to my Office to prevent us from investigating alleged crimes.

Mr President, Your Excellencies,

34. I also feel compelled to say a few words about resources. With the Office's multiple situations and cases, it will be increasingly difficult for the Office to allocate needed resources to the Darfur investigation in the coming year given the recently approved 2017 budget of the Court.

35. Nevertheless, despite limited resources, the total lack of cooperation by Sudan, and the inability to investigate in Darfur, my Office continues to conduct inquiries and investigations.

36. The team assigned to the Darfur situation has interviewed more witnesses since my last report, and obtained further evidence regarding not only previous crimes, but also allegations of current crimes. Further efforts are being made to identify potential witnesses.

37. In sum, despite many challenges, my team continues to make progress. The support of this Council for additional funding from the UN General Assembly would significantly increase the investigation capacity of my team.

Mr President, Your Excellencies,

38. On every occasion that I report to you on the situation in Darfur, I am forced to voice my concerns on the very same challenges; the sum total of which amounts to justice still eluding the victims in Darfur. I wish I could be here today informing the Council, and the victims, that the judicial process has significantly advanced. But I cannot. As long as this Council does not take direct action to induce Sudan and other States to execute the arrest warrants, I will likely be here next June delivering the same message. This lack of progress must weigh heavily on our collective conscience and must not be allowed to continue.

39. I end on this point, and ask the honourable Members of this Council to consider it carefully: it was a watershed moment for international criminal justice when this Council voted in favour of referring the situation in Darfur to the International Criminal Court. The referral signalled to the world and to the victims this Council's determination to fight against impunity and foster justice and accountability in Darfur. That determination must guide the Council today as it did then.

40. I ask this Council to give new life to your Resolution 1593 by giving my Office the support it needs in order to advance its investigations and prosecutions in the Darfur situation. For the sake of the victims in Darfur, you must break the current impasse.

41. Under the critical watch of history, we must not allow "Never Again" to ring hollow to taunt the memory of the victims in Darfur. To be sure, the world yearns to see this Council employ its authority with confidence and conviction in full support of international criminal justice.

Mr President, Your Excellencies,

42. This august body's effective follow-through in the Darfur situation is the Litmus test of the Council's ability to fulfill that promise.

43. I thank you for your attention.

See more: https://www.icc-cpi.int/Pages/item.aspx?name=161213-otp-stat-unsc-darfur

U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights Zeid Ra'ad Al Hussein Statement - Peace, Justice and Security Foundation Gala

The Hague, 5 September 2016

Dear Friends,

I wish to address this short statement to Mr. Geert Wilders, his acolytes, indeed to all those like him – the populists, demagogues and political fantasists. 

To them, I must be a sort of nightmare.  I am the global voice on human rights, universal rights; elected by all governments, and now critic of almost all governments.  I defend and promote the human rights of each individual, everywhere: the rights of migrants, asylum seekers and immigrants; the rights of the LGBTi community; the rights of women and children in all countries; minorities; indigenous persons; people with disabilities, and any and all who are discriminated against, disadvantaged, persecuted or tortured – whether by governments, political movements or by terrorists.

I am a Muslim, who is, confusingly to racists, also white-skinned; whose mother is European and father, Arab.  And I am angry, too.  Because of Mr. Wilder’s lies and half-truths, manipulations and peddling of fear.  You see, twenty years ago I served in the UN peacekeeping force during the Balkan wars – wars so cruel, so devastating, which flowed from this same factory of deceit, bigotry and ethnic nationalism.

Geert Wilders released his grotesque eleven-point manifesto only days ago, and a month ago he spoke along similar lines in Cleveland, in the United States.  I will not repeat what he has said, but there are many who will, and his party is expected to do well in the elections in March.

And yet what Mr. Wilders shares in common with Mr. Trump, Mr. Orban, Mr. Zeman, Mr. Hofer, Mr. Fico, Madame Le Pen, Mr. Farage, he also shares with Da’esh.

All seek in varying degrees to recover a past, halcyon and so pure in form, where sunlit fields are settled by peoples united by ethnicity or religion – living peacefully in isolation, pilots of their fate, free of crime, foreign influence and war.  A past that most certainly, in reality, did not exist anywhere, ever.  Europe’s past, as we all know, was for centuries anything but that. 

The proposition of recovering a supposedly perfect past is fiction; its merchants are cheats.  Clever cheats.

Populists use half-truths and oversimplification -- the two scalpels of the arch propagandist, and here the internet and social media are a perfect rail for them, by reducing thought into the smallest packages: sound-bites; tweets.  Paint half a picture in the mind of an anxious individual, exposed as they may be to economic hardship and through the media to the horrors of terrorism.  Prop this picture up by some half-truth here and there and allow the natural prejudice of people to fill in the rest.  Add drama, emphasizing it’s all the fault of a clear-cut group, so the speakers lobbing this verbal artillery, and their followers, can feel somehow blameless.

The formula is therefore simple: make people, already nervous, feel terrible, and then emphasize it’s all because of a group, lying within, foreign and menacing.  Then make your target audience feel good by offering up what is a fantasy to them, but a horrendous injustice to others.  Inflame and quench, repeat many times over, until anxiety has been hardened into hatred.

Make no mistake, I certainly do not equate the actions of nationalist demagogues with those of Da'esh, which are monstrous, sickening; Da’esh must be brought to justice.  But in its mode of communication, its use of half-truths and oversimplification, the propaganda of Da’esh uses tactics similar to those of the populists.  And both sides of this equation benefit from each other – indeed would not expand in influence without each others' actions.

The humiliating racial and religious prejudice fanned by the likes of Mr. Wilders has become in some countries municipal or even national policy. We hear of accelerating discrimination in workplaces. Children are being shamed and shunned for their ethnic and religious origins – whatever their passports, they are told they are not "really" European, not "really" French, or British, or Hungarian.  Entire communities are being smeared with suspicion of collusion with terrorists.

History has perhaps taught Mr. Wilders and his ilk how effectively xenophobia and bigotry can be weaponized.  Communities will barricade themselves into fearful, hostile camps, with populists like them, and the extremists, as the commandants.  The atmosphere will become thick with hate; at this point it can descend rapidly into colossal violence.

We must pull back from this trajectory.  My friends, are we doing enough to counter this cross-border bonding of demagogues?  A decade ago, Geert Wilder’s manifesto and Cleveland speech would have created a world-wide furore.  Now?  Now, they are met with little more than a shrug, and, outside the Netherlands, his words and pernicious plans were barely noticed.  Are we going to continue to stand by and watch this banalization of bigotry, until it reaches its logical conclusion? 

Ultimately, it is the law that will safeguard our societies – human rights law, binding law which is the distillation of human experience, of generations of human suffering, the screams of the victims of past crimes and hate.  We must guard this law passionately, and be guided by it.

Do not, my friends, be led by the deceiver.  It is only by pursuing the entire truth, and acting wisely, that humanity can ever survive.  So draw the line and speak.  Speak out and up, speak the truth and do so compassionately, speak for your children, for those you care about, for the rights of all, and be sure to say clearly: stop!  We will not be bullied by you the bully, nor fooled by you the deceiver, not again, no more; because we, not you, will steer our collective fate.  And we, not you, will write and sculpt this coming century.  Draw the line!

See more at: http://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/ZeidwarnsagainstdemagoguesinEuropeandUS.aspx 

CDIL Director Statement - Official Opening of the Permanent Premises of the ICC

Statement of William R. Pace

Convenor, Coalition for the International Criminal Court

 

Official Opening of the Permanent Premises of the

International Criminal Court

Tuesday, 19 April 2016, The Hague, The Netherlands

 

Your Majesty King Willem-Alexander of the Netherlands and

His Excellency Ban Ki-moon, Secretary-General of the United Nations

President Sidiki Kaba

President Fernández

Minister Koenders

Mayor van Aartsen

Excellencies, colleagues, ICC staff, and may I address also the victims of the crimes against humanity,

I have the great honor to speak on behalf of an extraordinary global network of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) of the Coalition for the International Criminal Court (CICC) - with millions of women and men, young and old, in over 150 nations -  and on behalf of the thousandswho contributed in the decade leading to the 1998 treaty, and on behalf of the hundreds of thousands who contributed to securing the ratification or accession of what is now 124 governments to the Rome Statute.

Very late in the night on July 17, 1998, I had the honor to congratulate the UN Member States that adopted, against almost all expectation, in a vote of 120 yes and 7 no, the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court.  I noted then that most of history is the never-ending narratives of wars won and peace lost, but July 17, 1998 would be remembered in history as a day that peace won and war lost.

Today, we are gathered to celebrate the opening of what is being hailed as the ‘peace palace of the twenty-first century.’ 

Tomorrow, Mr. Secretary-General, you celebrate a solemn anniversary of the International Court of Justice – whose wonderful home opened 100 years ago during what was then the eve of the worst great “world war” in history, and  whose 70th anniversary marks the conclusion of the even more catastrophic second “world war."

Ominously, it must be noted that we are gathered in another time of the horrific spread of war, terrorism, refugees, genocide and massive crimes against humanity. Today the Coalition is fiercely opposing the new waves of impunity, xenophobia, and denials of history and accountability.

We consecrate today the premises of the world’s permanent International Criminal Court, formed from the Rome Statute that entered into force just a short 14 years ago - a new world court already being asked to investigate a great number of terrible crimes against humanity that have occurred throughout the world.

However, Your Royal Highness, Mr. Secretary-General, excellencies, 2016 is not 1914, or 1946.  The UN Charter and strengthening of the international legal order in the last 70 years will, I believe, be recognized as unprecedented in world history. The strengthening of international criminal justice in the last 20 years, and especially the adoption of the Rome Statute and the establishment of the new system of international criminal justice and this great Court, will be viewed as revolutionary advancements of peace and the rule of law.

That many of the greatest instruments of peace, international humanitarian and human rights law could not be adopted today must only reinforce our commitment, our strength to protect the statute and the Court, and enhance our celebration of this great institution today.

In closing, on behalf of global civil society, I want to congratulate the Kingdom of the Netherlands and the City of The Hague for their enormous contributions to the rule of law since the 1899 Peace Conference, and I want to congratulate you, Mr. Secretary-General and your two predecessors, Secretary-Generals Annan and Boutros-Ghali for your historic support for creation and establishment of the ICC.

History will owe a tremendous debt to the partnership of the Coalition and the 70 like-minded governments - mostly the mid-size and small democracies - that stood up to the biggest powers and dictatorships who were trying to prevent the ICC being established, and who must stand up again to reject the ongoing serious threats and challenges to the ICC and the Rome Statute. 

We celebrate, too, the prospect of the anniversaries of this great institution of peace a century from now. 

Thank you very much.

CDIL Director statement - El Salvador Rome Statute ratification ceremony

Statement of William Pace, on behalf of the

Coalition for the International Criminal Court at the signing ceremony

on the accession of El Salvador to the Rome Statute -3 March 2016

On behalf of the Coalition for the International Criminal Court and our thousands of member organisations around the world, I want to thank you for this very meaningful ceremony.  It feels like there are too few actions to celebrate at the UN in these times.

I found this a very moving ceremony and hope future accessions may be treated with the same level of consecration as we are sharing today.

We wish to congratulate the Minister, President of the Parliamentary Commission, President Kaba, President Fernandez, the Secretary-General and Deputy Legal Counsel,  and of course Vice President Cardi for convening this signing meeting.

The accession of the government of El Salvador to the Rome Statute of the ICC is one of the clearest examples of how, going forward, universality will be achieved.  Leaders of communities and institutions throughout the international legal order and world community contributed to this accession over many years of efforts - ASP Presidents, ICC Presidents, members of our international NGO coalition, our Americas coalition, and the important efforts of our national coalition in El Salvador – and we must highlight our CICC Steering Committee member, Parliamentarians for Global Action whose work was crucial – so many meetings, missions, conferences over the last 10 years.

We join in congratulating El Salvador for considering and ratifying both the Rome Statue and the Kampala amendments at the same time.

Excellencies, the 124 State Parties of the Rome Statute Assembly of State Parties is one of the largest, most unique and most important intergovernmental groupings in the international legal order.  Of course, we have a long way to go, but we are near two-thirds of the international community – a new system of international criminal justice and a permanent court that we were told over and over would never happen in our lifetime.

This is an important meeting for another short clarification – we have heard so much misrepresentation of the term ‘selectivity’ in relation to the ICC – let us be very candid that the primary manifestations of so-called ‘selectivity’ are directly related to the gap in universal ratification and the exercise of complementarity– the 36% of governments that have not accepted the jurisdiction of the Rome Statute are the nations that are the primary cause of ‘selectivity.’

Again, having so many State Parties and Ambassadors attending this long-sought signing ceremony is one of the more moving meetings I have attended at UNHQ in a long time.

The Coalition promises to continue for as many years as it takes to join State Parties and ICC and UN leaders to achieve the end of impunity for the worst crimes in international law, to achieve universality.

Four Ideas for a Stronger U.N.

New York Times article by Kofi Annan and Gro Harlem Brundtland 

Excerpt:

Seventy years ago, the United Nations was founded “to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war.” Looking around the world today, the least one can say is that it is not fully succeeding in this mission. From Nigeria through the Middle East to Afghanistan and Ukraine, millions are suffering and dying from that scourge, or are imminently threatened by it, and the United Nations seems powerless to save them.

We have four ideas for making the organization stronger and more effective.

A big part of the problem is that the Security Council, which is supposed to maintain world peace and security on behalf of all member states, no longer commands respect — certainly not from armed insurgents operating across borders, and often not from the United Nations’ own members.

Throughout the world, and especially in the Global South, people struggle to understand why, in 2015, the Council is still dominated by the five powers that won World War II. They are more and more inclined to question its authority, and the legitimacy of its decisions.

We ignore this threat at our peril. Times have changed since 1945, and the Security Council must adapt.

Almost everyone claims to favor expanding the Council to include new permanent members, but for decades now states have been unable to agree who these should be, or whether, like the existing ones, they should have the power to veto agreements reached by their fellow members.

Our first idea aims to break this stalemate. Instead of new permanent members, let us have a new category of members, serving a much longer term than the nonpermanent ones and eligible for immediate re-election. In other words they would be permanent, provided they retained the confidence of other member states. Surely that is more democratic?

Read more:

http://www.nytimes.com/2015/02/07/opinion/kofi-annan-gro-harlem-bruntland-four-ideas-for-a-stronger-un.html?smid=tw-share

Ukraine Parliament calls on the ICC to investigate in Crimea and the East

Press Release by International Federation for Human Rights (FIDH)

Published by: Al-Haq 

Excerpt:

The Ukrainian Parliament adopted a resolution on 4 February recognising the jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court (ICC) over international crimes committed in Ukraine since 20 February 2014. Our organisations welcome this declaration inviting the ICC to investigate and prosecute those responsible for international crimes, in particular in Crimea and the Donbass region.

"Considering the intensification of violence in the East of Ukraine and the lack of capacity of the national justice system to genuinely investigate and prosecute perpetrators of crimes in these regions, this committment by Ukrainian authorities in favour of international justice and accountability could have a deterrent effect on the current conflict" , said Karim Lahidji, FIDH President.

"The Ukrainian executive should now confirm the recognition of the ICC jurisdiction over international crimes committed in Ukraine since February 2014, with no limitation of time, so that victims find adequate access to justice and redress. We hope this is an additional sign confirming the authorities’ will to swiftly take the needed legislative measures to ratify the ICC Statute" , said Oleksandra Matviychuk, Director of CCL.

On 4 February, no less than 271 Parliamentarians voted in favour of this declaration which, pursuing to Article 12(3) of the ICC Statute, enables the ICC to investigate and prosecute those responsible for international crimes committed on Ukrainian territory, whatever their nationality - may they be Russian, pro-Russian fighters or others - in case of lack of capacity or willingness of national authorities to do so. It is now up to the Ukrainian executive to make the formal declaration, thus confirming the Parliament resolution, in order for the ICC to have jurisdiction.

Read more:  https://www.fidh.org/International-Federation-for-Human-Rights/eastern-europe-central-asia/ukraine/16937-ukraine-parliament-calls-on-the-icc-to-investigate-in-crimea-and-the-east

Israel Above The Law: PHROC Strongly Condemns Israeli Efforts To Obstruct Justice

Published by: Al-Haq

Excerpt:

The Palestinian Human Rights Organisations Council (PHROC) condemns in the strongest terms Israel’s latest and unfortunately, far too common attempt to obstruct the work of international human rights and justice mechanisms in investigating Israeli violations of international law against the Palestinian population. The latest charade put up by Israel is an attempt to undermine an investigative report that will be published in March by a UN-established Commission of Inquiry looking into violations of international law carried out in occupied Palestine relative to military operations that took place from 13 June 2014 (the Commission). In this attempt, Israel seeks to cover up crimes committed against the Palestinian people last summer by accusing the Chairperson of the Commission, Professor William Schabas, of bias. The accusations are based on a legal opinion that Schabas had provided for the Palestine  Liberation Organization (PLO) in 2012. This legal opinion, the existence of which had been fully disclosed to the President of the Human Rights Council (HRC), was one of many that he had produced in his capacity as a renowned expert on international criminal law for different states and organizations over the years.

Professor Schabas made the decision to resign, in an effort to prevent the findings from being overshadowed by the Israeli allegations, which are a clear and disingenuous attempt to discredit the report of the Commission. The Commission will present its report at the upcoming HRC session in March and will provide strong legal argumentation, supported by hundreds of documented cases to show that Israel may have committed war crimes and crimes against humanity, and committed grave breaches of international humanitarian law last summer in occupied Palestine. While PHROC commends the Commission and its continued work, it is extremely disappointed that the HRC has allowed Israel to monopolise its work and decisions.

Read more: http://www.alhaq.org/advocacy/targets/united-nations/893-israel-above-the-law-phroc-strongly-condemns-israeli-efforts-to-obstruct-justice

Security Council Reform Update 2015: Similar Scenarios, Same Positions, New Outcomes?

Original Article found at Center for the UN Reform Education: 

http://www.centerforunreform.org/?q=node/627

Security Council Reform Update
originally published 12 January 2015

The Intergovernmental Negotiations (IGN) on reforming the Security Council (SC) have not led to any significant results on SC expansion since the IGN officially began in 2009. The IGN replaced the equally unsuccessful Open-Ended Working Group on the topic, established in 1993. Procedural maneuvering by those who oppose adding new permanent seats is often blamed for this vexing standstill. However, sufficient political will to compromise among some of the key players may be equally, if not more, responsible for the lack of progress. And while the main focus has been on changing the composition of the Council to make it more representative of contemporary realities, efforts to make the Council more accountable, effective, and transparent are of equal or greater importance to a large section of UN Member States.

At this stage, only one quarter of the UN’s membership appears to be actively engaged in the IGN, in spite of the many efforts to create momentum during the last few years by those who stand to gain the most from expanding the Council’s membership. This update describes recent developments and the latest positions of the various groupings.

The 68th Session - PGA John Ashe

Early on in his term, John Ashe from Antigua and Barbuda, President of the previous (68th) session of the General Assembly, did his best to push the slow-going IGN along. He established an Advisory Committee on Security Council reform in the fall of 2013 which produced a non-paper that many Member States hoped would replace the compilation/negotiations text. Since 2010, Member States have not been able to agree on which revision of the compilation/negotiations text - Rev2 or Rev3, each about 30 pages long - should have preference. Nor has there been agreement on how to streamline either of these long texts.

The Advisory Group’s non-paper - six pages long - failed to receive wide acceptance as a shorter negotiation text. Some countries thought that the non-paper could be the basis for the negotiations, but others felt it could merely guide the meetings, as it was not a definitive text produced by the whole membership. It did not help that Africa did not seem to have a common position on accepting such a shorter text. Reflecting the intensity of discord that he must have experienced after establishing the Advisory Group, Ashe noted at a press conference in late December 2013 that he did not expect Security Council reform to happen anytime soon.

The simple roll-over resolution drafted by Ashe to continue the IGN was adopted at the closing plenary on 7 September 2014, but did not make any reference at all to the Advisory Group’s non-paper, confirming the widespread understanding that Ashe did not really regard it as his non-paper. Nevertheless, G4 countries continue to call it the PGA’s non-paper, with Brazil still promoting it as a possible negotiation text. Calling it the Advisory Group’s non-paper is problematic as well, as one member of the group unsurprisingly dissented.

According to rumors, India had threatened to ask for a vote at the September 2014 plenary, but it was widely regarded as a bluff. Member States are aware that holding any votes in the SC reform process runs the risk of a large number of the Member States abstaining; or adopting a ‘non action’ procedural decision; or even of just not showing up unless provided with enough time or motivation to get clear instructions from their capitals. Moreover, initiating and losing such a vote is a risk that few career diplomats are willing to make or feel they can really afford.

Some powerful countries insist that this reform process should be done through consensus. Others believe that “more than the required majority” will be necessary, in line with decision 62/557’s phrase “widest possible political acceptance.” Decision 62/557 reflects the political compromise that was achieved during intense deliberations in the Open-Ended Working Group before the IGN started. Brushing this compromise aside may not be as easy as some believe.

In accordance with UN Charter provisions, amendments on the composition of the Security Council require the approval of 2/3rd of the membership present and voting. But, in this case, a resolution from 1998 (A/RES/53/30) stipulates that reform of the Security Council should be carried by 2/3rd of the whole membership: currently 129 out of a total of 193 (possibly somewhat less if any countries have lost their right to vote in the General Assembly for not paying their dues on time). Moreover, the Charter stipulates that any amendments have to be ratified by 2/3rd of the membership, including the five permanent members, before they come into effect.

Under the terms of 62/557, five issues are officially part of this reform effort: expansion, the right of veto, regional representation, size of the Council and working methods, plus the relationship of the Council with the General Assembly. These issues are a strange mixture: some require amendments to the Charter, while others do not. Moreover, some of those that do not involve a Charter change are already included under a different agenda item, namely “the Revitalization of the General Assembly,” where they have been under discussion for over 20 years.

Chair of the Intergovernmental Negotiations, Zahir Tanin (2009-2014)

In July 2012, Afghan Permanent Representative Zahir Tanin, who chaired the deliberations for six sessions, had asked the membership if he could produce a more concise text. Tanin’s 2012 request had greatly upset the Uniting for Consensus (UfC) grouping at the time, although the UfC did not seek to have Tanin replaced. (See more on the make-up and positions of key groupings below.) By the end of the 68th session, however, the Group of Four (G4) and some others had clearly lost patience with Tanin. The G4 contends that a Chair should just provide a shorter text, and need not ask for permission to do so. Apparently the G4 believes a shorter text would more readily facilitate a narrowing down of positions - through straw polls, for instance. Moreover, the G4 had hoped that Tanin would indicate in his assessment that a strong majority of the membership favored expansion in both categories: new permanent and new non-permanent seats.

But Tanin, correctly it seems, always made it clear that Member States subscribe to different versions of expansion. The possible variations are indeed manifold, including among others these scenarios: new permanent members with veto rights extended immediately; or extended with the caveat that those veto rights would (voluntarily) not be used until a review would take place; permanent seats without veto rights; longer-term seats that could become permanent seats after a review; longer-term seats that could be renewable through re-elections, creating de facto or semi-permanent seats; longer-term seats that could be immediately renewable only once without an interval; longer-term seats that would not be immediately renewable; non-permanent seats (or some of them) that could be renewable; additional two-year non-permanent seats besides new permanent seats, or only adding non-permanent seats. Complicating any assessment is the understanding that while some Member States publicly support one position, privately they indicate they could consider other options depending on how the reform process plays out.

At this time, it is not impossible for new creative options for expansion to be added - there is after all no final text on the table. When you add the questions as to whether veto rights should be limited in some way or whether new permanent seats should be nominated by regions - and perhaps represent their regions rather than serve in their national capacities - the complexity of reaching a decision becomes even more evident. Nor can the desire of many Member States for the Security Council to effectively change its working methods - so that it will be more transparent and accountable - be easily dismissed. For many countries this reform effort should be about efficiency as well as improved representation. Some Member States fear that a Council large enough to accommodate all aspirations - including recent proposals from the Arab Group, East Europeans, and small island states - could make reaching decisions in the Council even harder than it currently is.

The long run of Tanin’s chairmanship has been remarkable - no other Chairs of such important reform negotiations since 2005 have continued beyond one session. Undoubtedly, the loss of his experience could easily result in the replay of earlier scenarios that have run into obstacles before.

President of the 69th General Assembly, Sam Kutesa, and new Chair of the IGN, E. Courtenay Rattray

Sam Kutesa, President of the 69th General Assembly (PGA), did not reappoint Zahir Tanin as Chair. Instead, he approached at least a handful of Permanent Representatives to replace Tanin, but each politely declined to take on this demanding role. However, the Permanent Representative of Jamaica, E. Courtenay Rattray, accepted the challenge. It is worth noting that Jamaica is part of the L69 grouping and that Raymond Wolfe, Rattray’s predecessor, had played a very active role in the IGN, often closely echoing India’s stances in his statements.

Rattray now has the difficult task of being perceived as truly neutral, rather than as a champion of the most recently formulated goals of the L69 group. And as the foreign minister of Uganda, one of the countries that coordinates the African position in the C10, Kutesa probably has had a particular stake in the outcome before he became PGA. When he appointed Rattray, he said he hoped “Member States would move to text-based negotiations.” How Kutesa expects that to happen has not been publicly expanded on, to the Center’s best knowledge. What has been obvious for years is that the African group as a whole is reluctant to agree on any text that does not contain all the nuances and linkages of the common Ezulwini Consensus. This is one of the reasons that there is a great deal of internal and external pressure on African countries to revisit their common position.

Rattray reportedly earned a great deal of respect for the way in which he recently chaired the First Committee. And while he is relatively new to the IGN - he became Permanent Representative for Jamaica in June 2013 - he has probably received clear messages from the various groupings by now on how they would like to see the IGN develop, including comments on process as well as substance. In a letter dated 17 December 2014 to all Member States, Rattray explained he was reaching out to various players, inviting all Member States to contact his office if they would like to meet, before he would communicate his next steps. It is likely that as soon as he formulates possible steps forward, he will run into some of the oft-played out scenarios and obstacles. Creating fresh approaches while also appearing neutral will be a huge challenge. At this time it is unclear if the current PGA will try to push the Chair in a particular direction, or will be relatively hands-off. Some recent PGAs have started out with a real desire to find a solution, but lost interest later in their term because of the obvious complexities and intense pressures from the various groupings.

Text-based Negotiations

PGA Kutesa would like Member States to move to text-based negotiations. This is hardly a new idea. In December 2009, a large group of 138 countries signed a letter requesting the Chair to “present Member States ...a text with options to serve as a basis for negotiation.” 30 African countries had signed the letter. The UfC then wrote to the Chair that it agreed to a “document for the continuation of intergovernmental negotiations.” The text that was distributed on 10 May 2010 was actually called the “negotiation text” by Tanin. But because of opposition from various groupings about either Rev 2 or Rev 3 - plus the strong reservations from China and Russia about any text whatsoever - what was initially called a negotiation text is widely considered more of a compilation of positions.

If the new Chair would draft his own shorter text - by abridging Rev2 or Rev3, or by creating a synthesis from existing texts and new information received - there is a real danger that many Member States - apart from outright rejection - would insist on having their original positions put back in, even in an integral manner again rather than re-arranged in sections as was done for Revision 3.

In view of the risks, one of the key questions to ask at this time is whether a shorter text would really facilitate the negotiations. For instance, is there presently enough political will to bring about convergence among Member States for a particular outcome to be reached, following give-and-take negotiations? But without an agreed text, one insider claims, convergence cannot be efficiently pursued.

Membership on the Council was expanded from 11 to 15 in 1965. However, this expansion only entailed adding non-permanent members, a solution that did not significantly challenge the privileges and prerogatives of the five permanent members. Fifty years ago, less than a dozen countries (including permanent members) voted against the resolution setting the expansion in motion. This high level of agreement must have persuaded all permanent members to ratify the outcome, but dissent is much more intense this time around.

Current Positions

The Group of Four (G4: Brazil, Germany, India, and Japan) advocate for a new permanent seat for each of its members, as well as two such seats for Africa. The official stance of the G4 has been the same for a long time, although five years ago, Brazil, Germany and Japan seemed open to exploring compromise models such as longer-term seats, especially if they could transition into permanent seats at a later stage. But India did not concur. At present, the G4 is believed to be lobbying many capitals with its own non-paper that has the following elements on expansion and the right of veto:

“Membership of the Security Council shall be enlarged in both categories, new permanent members and new non-permanent members.
Member States should continue discussion on the use of the veto in certain circumstances and, in this context, the following voluntary offer is made.
New permanent members would as a principle have the same responsibilities and obligations as current permanent members. However, new permanent members shall not exercise the veto-right until a decision on the matter has been taken during a review, to be held 15 years after the coming into force of the reform.” (The non-paper also has brief language on the other issues listed in decision 62/557.)

Any new permanent members would technically have all the privileges of the existing permanent members but would agree not to use their veto rights for 15 years. Does this mean that a Charter change would have to take place creating additional permanent members with veto rights that could be reversed during a later review - and if successfully challenged - result in another Charter change removing their veto rights? [See herefor an analysis of the complexities in case of a review]

It seems doubtful that those countries who are willing to have new permanent seats added to the Council - but without veto rights being extended - would accept such a convoluted and risky solution. Because reversing earlier decisions during a review must be extremely difficult, it is quite likely that in such a case, some of those countries might end up preferring longer-term and renewable seats.

The African Group/C10

Although the African Group puts a common position forward in the IGN, it hides the same kind of internal divisions found in the other regions. There are self-nominated candidates (South Africa and Nigeria, among others); those that oppose them, including competing large countries and disgruntled neighbors; some that insist on veto rights to be extended as long as veto rights exist; some that are willing to compromise to bring about convergence with the G4; some that want African permanent seats to be accountable to their region, in which case every Council decision might have to go through the African Union in Addis Ababa, giving the whole region a veto; some that prefer longer-term rotating seats rather than new permanent seats; some that have little to gain and are quite indifferent at this point, etc.

In 2005, South Africa and Nigeria tried to bring about a convergence with the G4 that would allow a final decision on veto rights to be postponed until a future review took place. Resistance to this idea from parts of the African Union was intense and the Committee of 10 was established to act as a focal point on SC reform and to explore convergences with other groupings. The C10 represents the five African regions and consists of Algeria, Congo Brazzaville/Republic of the Congo, Equatorial Guinea, Kenya, Libya, Namibia, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Uganda, and Zambia.

The Ezulwini Consensus asks for two permanent seats with veto rights for Africa - to be elected by the AU - and a total of five non-permanent seats for their region. And while the US insists on knowing which countries would be picked, the African Group has not felt a need to agree about specific candidates because real negotiations have not taken place thus far in the IGN. And there is always the risk that Africa will get just one permanent seat, or that the solution of longer-term and/or renewable seats would turn out to be the only viable outcome. Hybrid options, such as a permanent seat for Africa plus longer-term seats for Africa and other regions, are not being explored, although many Member States recognize that Africa especially should benefit from expansion.

In 2012, a growing convergence between the C10 and L69 seemed to be taking place after the L69 grouping changed its position to include veto rights for new permanent seats to be extended immediately. However, efforts to agree on a common resolution fell through. Suspicions that L69’s new position was a mere ploy to break up the African position were rife at the time and some L69 members would openly admit that the 2012 L69 draft resolution was just an effort to create momentum. It seems that most of the 11 African members of L69 are willing to be more flexible about veto rights, belonging to the South African and Nigerian camps. Moreover, the 2012 L69 and 2013 CARICOM draft resolutions included the promise of a dedicated non-permanent and cross-regional seat for small island states, which could further complicate matters.

Last year, South Africa tried to bring about a high-level retreat to reconsider the Ezulwini Consensus. It failed, reportedly because the C10 was not properly consulted. At a meeting held in Kenya in November 2014, the C10 recommended “the holding of an Extra-Ordinary Summit of the AU specially devoted to the issues of the Security Council Reform.”

The P2 (permanent members France and the UK) also publicly favor new permanent seats for the G4 and two African countries. However, its stance differs significantly from that of the G4. The P2 would like to create a new category of longer-term seats that could become permanent seats after a review. Again, any relevant Charter amendments would be rather complex. And the extension of veto rights is left undecided.

France - and maybe the UK - is willing to voluntary refrain from using the veto in matters involving mass atrocities. It appears that none of those seeking new permanent seats have actively joined this stance, even though it could make extending veto rights more palatable to many. After all, it is the use of veto (or threatening to do so) that has made concerted Security Council action impossible at times. Interestingly, the AU’s founding principles include the notion of non-interference, with the exception of situations involving genocide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity.

The P3 (permanent members China, Russian Federation, and the US) publicly favor moderate expansion with some new permanent members, but they do not agree on which countries exactly, which might be intentional by making it even harder to find a solution. The P3 is unlikely to agree to the extension of veto rights or to leave it to the rest of the UN membership to elect new permanent members. Some sources indicate that the P3 is increasingly willing to consider longer-term seats, but are reluctant - or feel no need - to actively promote such a solution while Member States remain intensely divided. Probably, the status quo is the P3’s preferred option.

The Uniting for Consensus (UfC) group is opposed to adding any new permanent seats. Instead, they have advocated for adding only non-permanent seats or a new category of longer-term seats. Currently, this grouping is believed to favor possible terms of three or four years that could be immediately renewed once without an interval. In 2005 - during intense negotiations at the World Summit - it was reported to be willing to accept 10-year seats. Its members consist of regional rivals of the G4 and others espousing principled objections to permanent seats. Like any grouping it experiences internal divisions, with some being more flexible than others. It has a core membership of about a dozen members (Italy is the focal point and others are believed to be Argentina, Canada, Colombia, Costa Rica, Malta, Mexico, Pakistan, Republic of Korea, San Marino, Spain, and Turkey) and China and Indonesia take an active part in this grouping as well. It has come across as a grouping that uses procedural obstacles to stall the negotiations. To be fair, the African Group and some permanent members have often shared their objections on how to proceed. Besides the core group of the UfC, between 20-30 other Member States privately endorse the idea of longer-term and/or renewable seats. Some of these don’t like the strategies the UfC employs in the IGN process. Possibly - as long as the G4 overplays its cards or when it would renege on promises made thus far - support for longer-term and renewable seats may significantly increase.

L69. This grouping of developing countries consists of 40 Member States: G4 members Brazil and India, 11 African countries, plus small island states, CARICOM members and a handful of Member States from Latin America. At the IGN, Pacific small island states and CARICOM often make separate statements, but their membership largely overlaps with that of L69.

Interestingly, at a C10 meeting held in Oye last year, the C10 recommended that no African country should belong to any other grouping, but whether this has been acted upon is unclear to the Center at this time.

L69 was the name of a draft resolution that forced the IGN to start and its endorsers remained active, apparently regularly meeting at India’s Mission. The original L69 resolution called for expansion in both permanent and non-permanent categories, without specifically referring to veto rights. In 2012, however, the L69 announced at the IGN that it agreed to veto rights extended immediately. Since 2012 - after convergence with the C10 fell through - the grouping continuous to have some proponents that firmly believe in veto rights for new permanent members and also includes many that have been willing to be more flexible, in line with the G4. It seems likely that the G4 is lobbying the members of this grouping to endorse the principles of their 2014 non-paper.

Besides the above groupings, the Arab group has proposed having its own permanent seat, the East Europeans have advocated for a second dedicated non-permanent seat for themselves, and small island states would like a cross-regional non-permanent seat. These demands complicate those of the G4 and African groupings.

ACT promotes better working methods of the Council. ACT (Accountability, Coherence, and Transparency) comprises over 20 countries that have joined the group by invitation, with Switzerland as focal point. It concentrates on the working methods of the current - not expanded - Council, reflecting widespread skepticism that Security Council reform will happen anytime soon. Arguably, pressure from ACT and the former group S5 has already contributed to improved working methods, but much remains to be achieved. As a group it is not currently active in the IGN. ACT is believed to experience internal divisions similar to the other groupings.

Will 2015 be any different?

Can the reform process change in 2015 thanks to a new Chair, a new PGA, and with a significant Summit and UN anniversaries around the corner? Or will the same old scenarios - with some slight variations - play out in very much the same way in the end?

The G4 - the most active player in this process - clearly wants a shorter text for the IGN and the chance to reduce it even more by means of straw polls until a framework resolution will emerge that will allow moving the deliberations from informal meetings to a plenary where a solution can be voted on. But if this was easy to achieve, would it not have already materialized? It seems that any support for new permanent members is conditional on many unresolved issues: veto rights extended/limited or not; sufficient improvements in working methods; when and how would any new permanent members be chosen; can the demands of the Arab Group, East Europeans, and small island states be reconciled with those of the G4 and Africa, etc. And when it comes down to it, how many Member States are willing to stand up to the five permanent members, especially the powerful P3, for the direct benefit of only the G6 (G4 plus Nigeria and South Africa) - for a solution that cannot easily be revisited?

Adding SC reform to the agenda of the Special Summit on Sustainable Development in September 2015 has met considerable resistance. And the idea of convening a separate high-level meeting on SC reform around the same time has not garnered much support thus far. Potentially, both would create a deadline for the negotiations and get capitals re-engaged, possibly allowing for a ‘replay’ of efforts made during the 2005 Summit. Compared to Kofi Annan, however, it seems that the current Secretary General, Ban Ki-Moon, is considerably less keen to mix a wide variety of agenda items to be resolved at the same time. Especially for a Summit intended to determine the post-2015 development agenda.

Maybe, the new Chair can create new dynamics without being seen as partial. According to our sources, Rattray is understood to be “agnostic” and genuinely committed to move the process along. It will be interesting to see how much space he will get from the various players to do his job as Chair.

[For detailed description of Security Council reform efforts since 2005, see the Center’s 2013 publication atwww.centerforunreform.org/?q=node/604]

The major powers must unite behind the UN

by Douglas Roche

Published by: Embassy Magazine, Ottawa, September 17, 2014

Outside, the headlines blared the new war on the ISIS extremists in Syria and Iraq, but inside the United Nations headquarters in New York, the focus was on building a culture of peace and forging an agenda to wipe out the worst forms of poverty by 2030.

Destroy. Create. 

The tensions inside me were fierce as I watched debates play out in the one place charged by international law to protect the peace and security of the world.

The speeches were exhortatory. It was like standing on a mountain and reveling at the sight of the green fields below. But, at the same time, people over the horizon were being slaughtered by barbarians who have not the slightest regard for elementary humanitarian law.

For three days, I watched UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon open various meetings with words of encouragement, while he himself and the world body he represents were being completely ignored by United States President Barack Obama and the other kingmakers as they formed a new coalition to rout Middle East extremists.

I had come to New York to speak at a day-long forum to mark the 15th anniversary of the adoption of the UN Programme of Action on the Culture of Peace. This set of actions centering on non-violence and an end to all forms of discrimination, taken up by hundreds of civil society organizations and not a few governments, was eclipsed by the militarism that followed 9/11.

The Iraq and Afghanistan wars, with their devastating consequences, including giving birth to the extremists now running amok in the Middle East, have set the UN back. Yet the UN goes on planning for a better tomorrow.

Read more: http://www.wfm-igp.org/content/major-powers-must-unite-behind-un